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Director Good Faith Marches On: A
California Analysis of Director Termination
of Shareholder Derivative Suits Under
Burks v. Lasker
By Richard Victor Zolezzi*
On May 14, 1979, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Burks v. Lasker.1 In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the
Court held that in shareholders' derivative suits alleging violations-
of federal law under the Investment Company Act of 19402 (ICA)
and the Investment Advisers Act of 19401 (IAA), federal courts
should apply state law governing the authority of independent di-
rectors4 to discontinue shareholders' derivative suits to the extent
that state law is consistent with the underlying policies of the two
Acts.5
Burks involved a derivative action against the directors and
the investment adviser of Fundamental Investors Inc., a mutual
fund, for violations of the ICA and the IAA. The Court assumed
that an implied private right of action was authorized under the
Acts but expressly reserved decision on this issue.6 The Court rea-
soned that in determining whether directors have the authority to
terminate a shareholder derivative suit "the first place one must
look.. . is in the relevant State's corporation law. 'Corporations
are creatures of state law'. . . and it is state law which is the font
of corporate directors' powers."'7 The Court explained that because
federal securities law is "largely regulatory and prohibitory in na-
* B.A., 1977, Stanford University. Member, Third Year Class.
1. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976).
3. Id. §§ 80b-1 to -21.
4. For a discussion of the statutory definition of an interested director and the restric-
tions imposed on an interested director, see notes 30-39 & accompanying text infra.
5. 441 U.S. at 486.
6. Id. at 475-76. For a discussion of whether the ICA or the IAA implies a private right
of action for breach of a director's fiduciary duty, see notes 61-87 & accompanying text
infra.
7. 441 U.S. at 478 (citations omitted).
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ture," functioning primarily to limit rather than to create corpo-
rate powers, it "is generally enacted against the background of ex-
isting state law."8 Burks thus establishes a two-stage analysis for
determining whether derivative suits under the ICA or the IAA
may be validly terminated by a vote of disinterested directors of
the fund.9 Neither the district court 0 nor the court of appeals" in
Burks had considered whether under the relevant state law 1 2 the
independent directors had the authority to terminate the deriva-
tive suit. Therefore, the Court remanded the case to determine
first, whether the applicable state law would allow the directors to
terminate the derivative action, and second, whether such termina-
tion would be consistent with the policies underlying the IAA and
the ICA.1"
Three possible results may arise from an application of the
Burks test: (1) if state law does not allow termination, the corpo-
ration may either seek realignment to take control of the suit as a
8. Id.
9. Although Burks involved violations of the ICA and the IAA, several courts have
been willing to adopt the Burks analysis in cases involving alleged violations of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(a), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1976). See Lewis v. Ander-
son, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (construing California law); Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,
603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980) (construing Delaware law).
10. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
11. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978).
12. The relevant law is the law of the state of incorporation. Lewis v. Anderson, 615
F.2d at. 781; Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d at 728-29.
13. 441 U.S. at 486. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion criticizes the majority's two-
part test as unnecessary. Id. at 487 (Stewart, J., concurring). He argues that the only rele-
vant inquiry is whether the applicable state law allows termination by the independent di-
rectors. If termination of the derivative suit is allowed, he believes that it would be consis-
tent with the underlying federal policies of the Acts because the decision would be made by
independent directors required to serve on the board and that their independence serves to
protect shareholder interests. See notes 23-34 & accompanying text infra.
Justice Stewart's "one inquiry test" is appealing for its simplicity; however, it is over-
broad and unusable because it does not recognize any possible inconsistencies between state
law and federal policy. In defense of the two-part test, Justice Blackmun stated in his con-
curring opinion that "it seems . . . that a situation could very wel exist where state law
conflicts with federal policy." Id. at 487 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He fails, however, to
state any possible examples. For possible instances where applying California corporate law
to terminate a shareholder derivative suit under the ICA or the IAA would be inconsistent
with the federal policies underlying the Acts, see notes 127-78 & accompanying text infra.
Claims made under the ICA or the IAA involve federal questions, and therefore state sub-
stantive law, under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), need not be applied.
However, because neither the ICA nor the IAA contains a complete framework of corporate
law, state law is considered under the first prong of Burks. Although the two-pronged test is
admittedly vague, the second prong safeguards federal interests by allowing federal policy to
override state law in any area of inconsistency which might arise.
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plaintiff, or take a neutral position and allow the shareholders to
continue to prosecute the suit;14 (2) if state law allows termination
and such termination is consistent with federal policy, the decision
of the independent board of directors to terminate will compel dis-
missal of the shareholders' suit for lack of standing;15 (3) if state
law allows termination, but termination would be inconsistent with
federal policy, federal policy will override state law and the deriva-
tive suit will be allowed to continue.
16
This Note explores the result that would ensue under the
Burks analysis in a case arising under California law. The Note
first discusses the nature of the operation of a mutual fund com-
pany and the regulation of such companies under the ICA.17 Next
the Note analyzes the facts and holding of Burks and the recent
Supreme Court decision of Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis,"" which authorizes a limited private right of action under
the IAA, an issue the Burks court had expressly reserved for later
consideration.19 California law will then be explored to determine
the circumstances under which a shareholders' derivative suit,
brought under the ICA or the IAA, may be terminated by the
board of directors of a California corporation and whether such
termination would be consistent with the federal policies underly-
ing the Acts. Finally, the Note concludes that a federal court inter-
preting California law under the two-stage Burks analysis could
validly terminate a shareholder derivative action brought under ei-
ther the ICA or the IAA.
The Investment Company Act
A mutual fund, such as the one in Burks, is a type of regulated
investment company referred to in the investment company indus-
try as an "open-end" management company.20 It is a corporation,
14. See Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. at 1176.
15. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
16. In the context of derivative suits brought under the ICA or the IAA, state law
governs the authority of directors unless its "application would be inconsistent with the
federal policy underlying the cause of action." 441 U.S. at 479 (quoting Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)). See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434
(1964).
17. See notes 20-43 & accompanying text infra.
18. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
19. See 441 U.S. at 475-76.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a) (1976). The ICA divides regulated investment companies into
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incorporated under state law, but unlike other corporations, its
capital is composed almost entirely of liquid assets, consisting of
redeemable securities purchased with shareholder contributions.21
Another factor distinguishing mutual funds from other types of
corporations is that the mutual fund is managed externally by an
"investment adviser." The adviser is a separate company which re-
ceives a fee for its services, traditionally a fixed percentage of the
fund's net assets. 2 Because of the highly liquid nature of the
fund's assets and because of the control the adviser exercises over
the fund, the potential exists for the adviser to mismanage the
fund at the shareholders' expense.
The purpose underlying both the ICA and the IAA is to pro-
tect the investment company shareholder from the particular
abuses that are possible in the investment company industry by
regulating investment companies and their advisers. 23 Conflicts of
interest that arise between the adviser and the fund, and between
the fund and its other "affiliates" are the dangers that the ICA is
designed to protect against.2 4 At the heart of the problem is the
three types: (1) face amount certificate companies-investment companies that issue face
amount installment certificates; (2) unit investment trusts-investment companies that is-
sue only redeemable securities, do not have boards of directors, and do not include voting
trusts; and (3) management companies-investment companies that are neither face amount
certificate companies nor unit investment trusts. Id. § 80a-4.
21. COMM. ON INTFRSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 9 (1966). The
holders of the redeemable securities are entitled to obtain their proportionate share of the
fund's holdings upon demand. These shares are usually purchased and redeemed by the
company through its own underwriter.
22. Id. at 46. For a more detailed explanation of the structure of the investment com-
pany industry, see id. at 39-45; H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1940).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-11 (1940) (generally stating the
purpose of the Acts). See also S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33, reprinted in
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4927 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 184];
Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in Open-End Mutual Funds, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 696, 696-99 (1972).
24. A Senate report accompanying the enactment of the ICA stated: "Basically the
problems flow from the very nature of the assets of investment companies. The assets of
such companies invariably consist of cash and securities, assets which are completely liquid,
mobile and readily negotiable. Because of these characteristics, control of such funds offers
manifold opportunities for exploitation by the unscrupulous managements of some compa-
nies." S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Seas. 6 (1940). The House report accompanying the
enactment states further that "[tihese abuses have been persistent and have occurred and
recurred constantly during the last 10 years. That investors in investment trusts and invest-
ment companies are subject to substantial losses at the hands of unscrupulous persons is
obvious from the very nature of the assets of such companies." H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1940).
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fact that the investment adviser is the former promoter of the mu-
tual fund it manages. As promoter, it selects the fund's first board
of directors who in turn select the promoter as the fund's adviser.2 5
From this relationship various abuses by the adviser are possible.
For example, the adviser can attempt to use inside information to
benefit its associates or the family members of its officers;26 it can
exert its influence over the fund to negotiate a particularly advan-
tageous compensation contract for its advisory services; 27 it can
manipulate the information that is disclosed in the fund's proxy
statements;28 and, if independence is not adequately monitored, it
can influence the decision of an otherwise independent board of
directors to terminate a shareholders' derivative suit alleging mis-
conduct of the adviser.2 9
To prevent abuse by the investment adviser, the original ICA
provided express safeguards. It required that no more than 60% of
the registered fund's board of directors could be "affiliated" direc-
tors.30 The remaining unaffiliated or independent directors would
presumably guard the independence of the fund.3 1 Their indepen-
dence, however, was questionable. Although an unaffiliated direc-
tor could not contemporaneously be an officer, director, or manager
of the investment adviser, he or she could own up to 4.99% of the
investment adviser's outstanding stock.32 In addition, the require-
ment of being "unaffiliated" did not prohibit close family relations
between the fund's directors and the adviser's officers, nor were
there any prohibitions against the existence of other business rela-
tionships between them.33 The potential for partisanship also ex-
25. See S. REP. No. 184, supra note 23, at 5.
26. Conference On Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1967).
27. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 813.
29. See notes 147-60 & accompanying text infra.
30. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 10, 54 Stat. 789. The term "affiliated"
is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976).
31. "Congress . . mandated independent directors in order 'to supply an indepen-
dent check on management and to provide a means for the representation of shareholder
interests in investment company affairs."' Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 749 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976) (quoting S. REP. No. 184, supra note 23, at 32).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A) (1976).
33. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 67-68 (1966). "The
function of these [amending] provisions with respect to unaffiliated directors is to supply an
independent check on management and to provide a means for the representation of share-
holder interests in investment company affairs.
Your committee believes that the definition of an 'affiliated person' in section 2(a)(3) of
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isted because the regular directors of the fund chose the "unaffili-
ated" directors.-'
In order to ensure greater independence of the "disinterested"
directors, the ICA was amended in 19701" to provide that no more
than 60% of the fund's board can be "interested" persons, rather
than "affiliated" persons.36 "Interested person"37 is defined to in-
clude various persons who were not previously included by the
looser definition of affiliated person.38 A Senate Report stated that
the broader term "interested person" would include:
affiliated persons of an investment company, its investment ad-
viser and principal underwriter, as well as members of the imme-
diate family of such affiliated persons and persons who have ben-
eficial interests or legal interests as fiduciaries in securities issued
by the investment adviser, principal underwriter and their con-
trolling persons. The term would also include any... legal coun-
sel for an investment company, its investment adviser and princi-
pal underwriter and partners and employees of such legal counsel.
Interested person would also include persons who have any
material business or professional relationships with an investment
company .... 39
Another safeguard intended to protect the interests of invest-
ment company shareholders is provided by section 15 of the ICA.40
Section 15 provides that the first advisory contract must be ap-
proved by holders of a majority of the outstanding voting securi-
ties. This safeguard, however, has not proved effective because the
promoter controls the initial voting securities and thus can control
the [original] Act does not'adequately meet this purpose. Under this definition a director
who has strong ties with the company's managers may be classified as 'unaffiliated'. For
example, a director is presently deemed 'unaffiliated' even though he owns up to 4.99 per-
cent of the adviser-underwriter's stock, has substantial business or professional relationships
with the investment company or its adviser-underwriter, or is closely related by blood or
marriage to the company's managers." S. REP. No. 184, supra note 23, at 32.
34. For a discussion of the interrelatedness between the adviser, the fund's directors,
and the fund's independent directors, see Conference On Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. Rv.
669, 738-47 (1967). Mr. Pomerantz, arguing for greater SEC control, stated that "noth-
ing-hut nothing-approaches the open end mutual fund for incestuous relationships. . ...
Who picks the unaffiliated directors? The affiliated men .... The men who need to be
watched pick the watchdogs to watch them." Id. at 739 (comments of A. Pomerantz).
35. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976).
37. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19).
38. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3).
39. S. Rp. No. 184, supra note 23, at 33.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (1976).
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the selection of the fund's adviser.41
As a final safeguard, the ICA imposes a fiduciary duty on any
officer, director, or investment adviser of a mutual fund,42 and ex-
pressly authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to
bring an action against such persons for any conduct constituting a
breach of such fiduciary duty.43
Burks v. Lasker
In Burks v. Lasker,44 two stockholders of Fundamental Inves-
tors, Inc. (the Fund), a registered open-end investment company, 5
brought a derivative action against the Fund's investment adviser
and several of its directors.' The complaint arose in connection
41. Comment, Duties of the Independent Director In Open-End Mutual Funds, 70
MICH. L. REv. 696, 699 (1972).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1976).
43. Id. § 80a-35(a). Under the original Act, a fiduciary would breach the fiduciary duty
only if he or she engaged in practices of "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust." Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 36, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
35(a) (1976)). Section 20 of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-35(a) (1976), amended the Act to allow an action by the SEC for even a simple "breach
of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." The statute provides in part: "The Com-
mission is authorized to bring an action [for]... any act or practice constituting a breach
of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment
company for which such person so serves or acts (1) as officer, director, member of any
advisory board, investment adviser, or depositor; or (2) as principal underwriter, if such
registered company is an open-end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certifi-
cate company. . . ." Id. For a discussion of whether this section allows an implied right of
action by the security holder, see notes 61-87 & accompanying text infra.
44. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
45. The Fund is a Delaware corporation registered under § 8 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-8 (1976). This section provides that an investment company becomes registered by filing
a notification of registration with the SEC. Within a reasonable time after registration, as
the Commission shall establish, a registered investment company must file a registration
statement which includes: (1) a recital of the policy of the registrant; (2) a recital of all
investment policies not enumerated in (1) above which are changeable only if authorized by
shareholder vote; (3) a recital of all policies not mentioned in (1) or (2) above which the
registrant considers matters of fundamental policy; (4) the name and address of each affili-
ated person of the registrant; and (5) the same information and documents which would be
required to be filed in order to register under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77bbbb (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
46. Anchor Corporation, the Fund's investment adviser, is registered under § 3 of the
IAA, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1976). This section provides that an investment adviser may apply
for registration with the SEC by filing an application for registration. Information in the
application must include: (1) the name and type of organization under which the applicant
intends to do business; (2) the education of the applicant and his or her present and past
business affiliations for the previous ten years; (3) the nature of the business of the appli-
cant as well as the manner of advising and rendering opinions; (4) the applicant's nature
November 1980]
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with the Fund's purchase of $20,000,000 in Penn Central 270-day
commercial paper from Goldman, Sachs & Co. in late 1969. In
June, 1970, Penn Central ified a petition for reorganization under
section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act47 with the result that the com-
mercial paper was not paid at maturity. The complaint alleged vio-
lations of the ICA and the IAA, and breach of common law fiduci-
ary duty.48 It charged that the Fund and its adviser were negligent
in purchasing the commercial paper because they did not make an
independent inquiry into the stability of Penn Central but relied
solely on the recommendation of the seller.' 9
The complaint was filed in 1973 and named as defendants five
of the ten directors of the Fund's board. In 1974, the entire board
decided that the remaining five directors, who were not named in
the suit, should determine on behalf of the board what action
should be taken regarding the derivative suit.50 The "disinter-
ested" minority met in private51 and solicited independent legal
advice to aid in reaching its determination. Approximately five
months after it began considering the derivative action, the com-
mittee decided that prosecution of the suit was contrary to the
best interests of the shareholders of the Fund, and it therefore di-
rected counsel to seek dismissal of the action.
Burks raised a question of first impression under the law of
Delaware: Whether a special minority committee of the board,
whose members were not considered interested under the ICA, 2
and scope of authority over clients' funds; (5) the nature of compensation; (6) whether the
applicant or any person associated with the applicant are subject to any disqualifications
which might prohibit registration; (7) a statement whether the principal business of the
applicant will consist of being an investment adviser; and (8) a statement whether a sub-
stantial portion of the applicant's duties will consist of giving supervisory services. If there
is no basis for disqualification, registration becomes effective 30 days after filing the
application.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976).
48. Specifically, the complaint alleged violations of §§ 13(a)(3) and 36 of the ICA, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-13(a)(3), -35 (1976) (unauthorized deviation from investment policy and
breach of statutory fiduciary duty). It also alleged violations of § 206 of the IAA, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-6 (1976) (prohibited transactions by investment advisers). The complaint also alleged
breach of common law fiduciary duties both on the part of the Fund's directors and by the
investment adviser.
49. For the most complete statement of the facts, see Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp.
1172, 1174-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
50. Id. at 1175.
51. Id. at 1176. For a discussion of the importance of the committee's independence
and of meeting independently as a committee, see notes 147-60 & accompanying text infra.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1976).
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could terminate a nonfrivolous derivative action against the Fund's
other directors. The trial court decided that under the business
judgment rule,53 the special committee had the power to terminate
the derivative action," and it therefore granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.55 The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that because of the nature of the mu-
tual funds industry and the inherent risk of abuse, minority direc-
tors do not have the power to terminate nonfrivolous litigation




The Supreme Court granted certiorari and then reversed the
court of appeals' judgment, holding that even though the cause of
action arose under federal law, state law must be examined to de-
termine whether the derivative, suit could be terminated by the di-
rectors.5 If the ICA and IAA actions could be terminated under
state law, then the court must determine whether the application
of state law would frustrate the policies of the Acts.5 9 Because the
lower courts had not considered Delaware law, which was the rele-
vant state law, the case was remanded to determine whether under
Delaware law an independent minority of the board could decide
to terminate the derivative suit.
The Court expressly assumed that there was an. implied pri-
vate right of action under the ICA and the IAA because the parties
did not raise the issue and it was not addressed in the lower courts.
The Court, however, made clear that it was not deciding this point,
indicating that it would not do so until the issue was properly
presented to it.e°
53. The business judgment rule provides that: "If in the course of management, direc-
tors arrive at a decision, within the corporation's powers (intra vires) and their authority,
for which there is a reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their inde-
pendent discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what
they honestly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court will not interfere
with internal management and substitute its judgment for that of the directors to enjoin or
set aside the transaction or to surcharge the directors for any resulting loss." H. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPsOATIONs 482 (2d ed. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
54. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
55. Id. at 853.
56. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978).
57. 439 U.S. 816 (1978).
58. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 475-76.
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Private Rights of Action Under the ICA and the
IAA
Before the two-stage analysis of Burks can be applied, it must
be determined whether an express or an implied private right of
action exists under the ICA or the IAA. Section 36(b) of the ICA
expressly provides a narrow private right of action for damages
arising out of breach of the investment adviser's fiduciary duty
concerning its compensation for services.61 Such a right to dam-
ages, however, does not include the right to sue for breaches of
fiduciary duty unrelated to the adviser's contract.62 Although sev-
eral circuit court decisions have found an implied private right of
action for damages for breach of fiduciary duty under both the
ICA and the IAA,6s these decisions must be reconsidered in light of
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
62. Id. § 80a-35(b)(3). Section 80a-35(b) provides in part: "For the purposes of this
subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of pay-
ments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company or by the security
holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment
adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a secur-
ity holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against such
investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such investment adviser ... for breach of
fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation .... " (emphasis added).
The ICA also provides a limited private right of action in § 30(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f)
(1976) (use of inside information directly or indirectly by beneficial owners of more than
10% of any class of outstanding securities issued by a closed-end investment company).
This section, which imposes the same duties and liabilities as those of § 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), applies only to closed-end companies and not
to an open-end mutual fund as in Burks.
63. See, e.g., Wilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct. 442 (1979) (finding an implied private right of action in §
206 of the IAA); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 905, 913 (1978) (finding an implied private right of action in § 206 of the IAA);
Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971) (imply-
ing a private right of action based on "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" under the
pre-1970 version of the ICA); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969) (implying a private right of action based on the investment
company's failure to register under the ICA). But see Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,761, at 96,505 (S.D. Cal. 1974)
(refusing to imply a private right of action under the IAA).
Both Wilson and Abrahamson relied heavily upon the four criteria of Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975), in determining that implied private rights of action existed under the IAA.
The factors of Cort relevant to finding an implied right of action are: "(1) whether the
statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member, (2)
whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy, (3) whether
implication of such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme, and (4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject
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the recent Supreme Court decision in Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis.6'
In Transamerica, which dealt only with the IAA, a derivative
suit was brought alleging violations of the IAA and of common law
fiduciary duties.65 The Court held that the IAA creates neither an
express68  nor an implied private right of action for damages.1
7
However, the Court did find that section 215 of the IAA, which
provides that contracts violating the Act are void, impliedly creates
a private right of action for contract rescission, injunctive relief,
and restitution."8 The Court also considered section 206 of the
IAA,8 9 an antifraud provision with language similar to that of sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193470 and deter-
matter involves an area basically of concern to the states." Id. at 78. The Abrahamson court
further buttressed its conclusion of finding an implied private right of action in § 206 of the
IAA by analogizing § 206 of the IAA to other securities laws where a private right of action
had been recognized. 568 F.2d at 872-73 (citing J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(implying a private right of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)), and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(implying a private right of action under § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of'1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1976))). The Abrahamson court noted the similar language of § 10b of the 1934
Act and § 206 of the IAA.
64. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
65. There exists a common law action for breach of trust because of the fiduciary rela-
tionship of the fund's directors and the investment adviser to the investor. A trust "is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." REsTATE-
MENT (SecoND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). For a definition of a fiduciary relation, see id. at
comment (b).
66. 444 U.S. at 14.
67. Id. at 19-20. However, Justice White stated in his dissent that "[i]n reaching this
decision, the [majority] ... departs from established principles governing the implication of
private rights of action by confusing the inquiry into the existence of a right of action with
the question of available relief. By holding that damages are unavailable to victims of viola-
tions of the Act, the Court rejects the conclusion of every Circuit Court of Appeals that has
considered the question." Id. at 25 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 19. Section 215 of the IAA, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), provides in part that
"[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter ... shall be void
...." (emphasis added). Although the Court refused to find an action for damages, the
relief provided is nevertheless substantial. A rescinding party is entitled to restitution of all
consideration paid under the contract less any value given in return. 444 U.S. at 24 n.14.
The Court noted further, however, that "compensation for any diminution in the value of
the rescinding party's investment alleged to have resulted from the adviser's action or inac-
tion" is not allowed. If such compensation were allowed it would provide an indirect damage
remedy that Congress did not confer. Id.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
70. Id. § 78j.
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mined that the section also does not provide any implied right of
action. 71 In so holding, the Court did not even attempt to distin-
guish section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which has been found to imply
such a right.72 Instead, as if section 206 of the IAA could be inter-
preted without reference to other securities laws, the Court held
that the language "simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not
in terms create or alter any civil liabilities." 8 This innovative
treatment of section 206 appears to reflect the Court's present in-
clination to limit as much as possible private relief under the IAA
as well as under securities law in general. The Court stated that its
conclusion was based on congressional intent: "While some opin-
ions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the de-
sirability of implying private rights of action in order to provide
remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute...
what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended
to create the private remedy asserted .. .
To buttress its holding that no other express or implied pri-
vate rights of action exist under the IAA, the Court cited language
of other legislation to indicate that when Congress intends to pro-
vide a private right of action it expressly creates that right in the
legislation. 5 In particular, the Court cited section 35(b) of the ICA
which provides a limited damage remedy for breach of an invest-
ment adviser's fiduciary duty regarding its compensation con-
tract.7 6 The Court's emphasis on language and intent thus indi-
cates that first, because the IAA contains no similar express right
of action language it does not provide a similar private right of
action for damages, and second, within the ICA itself, Congress did
not intend and the Court will not recognize any private rights of
action for damages aside from those expressly stated.
71. 444 U.S. at 19-20.
72. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See note 63
supra.
73. 444 U.S. at 19.
74. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 20-21 n.10 (citing Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771
(1976); Securities Exchange Act of.1934, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r
(1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 30(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1976)). Section
16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), provides in part: "Suits to recover such
profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if
the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter . .. ."
76. 444 U.S. at 22-23 n.13. See note 62 supra.
[Vol. 32
Although Transamerica dealt only with the IAA, its aggressive
reasoning in construing the IAA indicates that the Court would
similarly restrict private relief if faced with a claim under the ICA.
With language virtually identical to that of section 215 of the IAA,
section 47(b) of the ICA provides that any contract made in viola-
tion of the Act shall be void. 7 Courts interpreting this provision
have held that it provides a limited private right to equitable re-
lief. In Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp.,7s rescission of a newly negoti-
ated adviser's contract was made under section 47(b) when it was
determined that ratification of the new contract was induced by
breach of the directors' fiduciary duty and a false and misleading
proxy statement. The court further determined that the adviser
was unjustly enriched under the fraudulently obtained contract
and, therefore, an award in the nature of restitution was made.7e
Similarly, in Mathers Fund, Inc. v. Colwell Co.,80 a mutual
fund sought rescission under section 47(b) of a sale of stock that it
had made to an "affiliated" corporation.81 Because section 17(a)(2)
of the ICA82 prohibits the sale of stock by a mutual fund to an
"affiliated person" and because the stock had increased in value,
the fund hoped to reap a windfall through rescission. In denying
the fund's claim for equitable relief, the court indicated that al-
though such relief was available under section 47(b) of the ICA,
the particular facts of the case showed that relief was not
merited.8s
77. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(b) (1976) provides: "Every contract made in violation of any
provision of this subchapter or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, and every con-
tract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or
the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this sub-
chapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights
of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have
made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of
any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereun-
der with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of
such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order."
78. 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1977).
79. 545 F.2d at 814.
80. 564 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. See notes 30-34 & accompanying text supra.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1976) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any affili-
ated person. . . of. . . a registered investment company.., knowingly to purchase from
such registered company. . . any security or other property (except securities of which the
seller is the issuer) . .. ."
83. 564 F.2d at 783.
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These cases interpreting section 47(b) of the ICA84 are pre-
Transamerica cases. However, in light of the Transamerica
Court's similar treatment of the almost identical language of sec-
tion 215 of the IAA, it appears that the same limited equitable
relief as granted under Galfand is still available. It must be
remembered, however, that while Transamerica delineates and re-
affirms the nature of certain equitable relief under the IAA, and
thus impliedly under the ICA, prior lower court cases implying a
private right of action for damages under the IAA are overruled,
and cases implying such relief under the ICA are extremely
suspect.8 5
Assuming general allegations of breach of fiduciary duty under
the ICA as in Burks,86 if a plaintiff shareholder cannot bring his or
her claim under any ICA provision expressly granting a private
right of action,87 it is unlikely because of the reasoning of Tran-
samerica that the Court will imply any private right of action
other than for injunctive relief, rescission, or restitution.
The Right of Directors to Terminate
A Derivative Suit in California
The Business Judgment Rule
Assuming that at least a limited implied private right of action
exists under the ICA, the first stage of the Burks analysis88 man-
dates that the trial court look to California law 9 to determine
whether a disinterested board of directors can terminate a deriva-
tive action brought on behalf of a California corporation." The
84. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(b) (1976).
85. See note 63 supra.
86. See note 48 supra.
87. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
88. 441 U.S. at 480.
89. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 670 (1980) (holding that the relevant state law to be considered under the Burks
analysis is the law of the state of incorporation).
90. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1977) recognizes derivative suits but requires that
the plaintiff shareholder be a contemporaneous owner of stock and that proper demand be
made upon the directors before initiating the suit. Section 800(b) provides in part that "[n]o
action may be instituted or maintained in right of any domestic or foreign corporation by
any holder of shares or of voting trust certificates of such corporation unless both of the
following conditions exist: (1) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that plaintiff was a
shareholder, of record or beneficially, or the holder of voting trust certificates at the time of
the transaction or any part thereof of which plaintiff complains or that plaintiff's shares or
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leading California case on this subject is Findley v. Garrett.91 In
Findley, the court of appeal held that it was within the discretion
of the board of directors of Douglas Aircraft Company to terminate
a shareholder derivative action brought on behalf of the corpora-
tion. The complaint alleged that the Douglas directors and execu-
tives had breached their fiduciary duties by diverting profits or by
acquiescing in the diversion of profits to another corporation that
was partially owned and controlled by some of Douglas' directors. 
2
The court, relying upon the business judgment rule,93 held that al-
though "[t]he board was aware of the dual position and conflicting
duties of those individuals who were or had been directors of both
corporations. . . [t]here was no manifest breach of duty in its de-
cision not to commence an action. The board exercised its business
judgment."" The court therefore allowed the board to terminate
the suit even though some of the directors were named defendants.
In California, a plaintiff shareholder in a derivative suit can-
not implicate an entire board of directors, and thereby block the
directors' decision to terminate the suit made according to their
good faith business judgment, by making unsupported allegations
of fraud and conspiracy against the directors. In Findley, the
plaintiff had attempted to implicate the entire board of directors
of Douglas by generally alleging fraud and conspiracy, but the
court rejected these general allegations as insufficient because no
specific facts were pleaded to support them. The court accepted
the defendants' argument that the majority of Douglas Aircraft
Company's board did not have a financil interest in the other cor-
voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon plaintiff by operation of law from a holder
who was a holder at the time of the transaction or any part thereof complained of ... and
(2) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity plaintiff's efforts to secure from
the board such action as plaintiff desires, or the reasons for not making such effort ..
91. 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952).
92. Id. at 175, 240 P.2d at 426. Specifically, the complaint alleged that in refusing to
prosecute the derivative action, the Douglas directors "did not act in good faith, that the
transactions complained of involved divided loyalty, breach of trust, fraud, and fraudulent
concealment by corporate fiduciaries." Id.
93. See note 53 supra.
94. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 178, 240 P.2d at 431 (emphasis added). See Fornaseri v. Cos-
mosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 557, 274 P. 597, 600 (1929) ("In the absence
of fraud, breach of trust or transactions which are ultra vires, the conduct of directors in the
management of the affairs of a corporation is not subject to attack by minority stockholders
in a suit at equity, where such acts are discretionary and are performed in good faith, rea-
sonably believing them to be for the best interest of the corporation").
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poration, 5 and that the board's decision not to commence the ac-
tion was therefore made by an independent majority not impli-
cated in the alleged wrongdoings 8 The court found that "[an
independent majority of the board, in the determination of a dis-
cretionary matter, [had] declined to commence an action. '9 7 On
the other hand, if a shareholders' complaint adequately alleges
fraud against the directors and is supported by facts, a decision by
the directors to terminate the suit should not be recognized and
the suit should continue because the sufficiency of the fraud allega-
tion blocks any claim that the board's decision to terminate was
made in good faith.
In determining whether to uphold a corporate board's decision
to terminate a derivative suit brought on behalf of a California cor-
poration, a California court may also consider whether the direc-
tors' decision not to prosecute the suit is so clearly against the best
interests of the corporation that the decision can not be said to
have been made independently and in good faith. In Findley, the
court considered the alleged facts in light of this test but found no
indication that the decision was so grossly wrong as to reflect nega-
tively on the board's independence and good faith. 8 In Fairchild v.
Bank of America," the court made this same inquiry. The court
stated that
[t]o warrant interference by a court in favor of minority stock-
holders.., a case must be made out which plainly shows that
such action is so far opposed to the true interests of the corpora-
tion itself as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting
could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such
interest, but that he must have acted with an intent to subserve
some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the
95. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 173-74, 240 P.2d at 425.
96. Id. at 176-77, 240 P.2d at 427-28.
97. Id. at 177, 240 P.2d at 427. This approach was followed by the court several years
later in Starbird v. Lane, 203 Cal. App. 2d 247, 21 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1962), a case involving a
shareholder derivative suit against the directors of an incorporated country club for mis-
management. The complaint in Starbird alleged that certain directors "are under the con-
trol and domination of the defendant" and that "all of the defendants ... have been guilty
of fraudulent and dishonest acts and gross abuse of authority and discretion." Id. at 252, 21
Cal. Rptr. at 283. The court found these allegations too conclusory, id. at 257, 21 Cal. Rptr.
at 286, and stated that "general charges of fraud, conspiracy and bad faith on the part of
corporate directors are insufficient in the absence of allegations of specific facts adequate to
show the basis for the general charges." Id. at 255, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
98. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 177, 240 P.2d at 427-28.




Thus, California recognizes that an independent majority of the
board can terminate derivative suits according to the business
judgment rule. Minority shareholders cannot disqualify otherwise
independent directors by unsupported allegations of fraud on in-
formation and belief. However, when the court is faced with a busi-
ness decision which appears so grossly wrong that it indicates the
directors' interestedness, the court may disallow termination of the
derivative suit.
Special Committees of the Board
California law allows the formation of special committees of
the board.10' Although there is as yet no California case law re-
garding the exercise of the business judgment rule by a special
committee of the board to terminate a derivative action, section
311 of the Corporations Code102 authorizes the appointment of spe-
cial committees and does not limit the committee's power to act
with full authority of the entire board. Therefore, if the board of
100. Id. at 257, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (quoting Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg.
Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 558, 274 P. 597, 600 (1929)).
101. CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1980) provides in part: "The board may, by
resolution adopted by a majority of the authorized number of directors, designate one or
more committees, each consisting of two or more directors, to serve at the pleasure of the
board .... Any such committee, to the extent provided in the resolution of the board or
in the bylaws, shall have all the authority of the board, except with respect to: (a) The
approval of any action for which this division also requires shareholders' approval ... or
approval of the outstanding shares .... (b) The filling of vacancies on the board or in any
committee. (c) The fixing of compensation of the directors for serving on the board or on
any committee. (d) The amendment or repeal of bylaws or the adoption of new bylaws. (e)
The amendment or repeal of any resolution of the board which by its express terms is not so
amendable or repealable. (f) A distribution to the shareholders of the corporation... ex-
cept at a rate or in a periodic amount or within a price range determined by the board. (g)
The appointment of other committees of the board or the members thereof." (emphasis
added).
The Fund in Burks was a Delaware corporation, and Delaware law similarly allows the
formation of special committees of the board. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1975). With
certain exceptions generally regarding mergers, consolidations, and sales of major corporate
assets, the statute provides: "The board of directors may, by resolution passed by a major-
ity of the whole board, designate 1 or more committees .... Any such committee, to the
extent provided in the resolution of the board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corpora-
tion, shall have and may exercise all the powers and authority of the board of directors in
the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. . . ." For examples of simi-
lar legislation, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-9 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712
(McKinney Supp. 1979).
102. CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1980).
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directors cannot rely upon the business judgment rule to terminate
a derivative action because a majority of the board are named de-
fendants against whom specific facts have been pleaded, California
statutory law does not prevent the board from appointing a special
committee of independent directors to make the decision. Al-
though in Findley the court had to determine whether a majority
of the board voting for termination was in fact disinterested, it did
not deal with a specially appointed committee of the board.103 In
the recent case of Lewis v. Anderson,10 4 however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of
whether California law would allow a special committee of the
board to terminate a derivative action once the committee deter-
mined in its business judgment that the suit would be contrary to
the corporation's best interest.
In Lewis, two minority shareholders of Walt Disney Produc-
tions appealed from partial summary judgment barring their deriv-
ative action against certain directors. Their action alleged viola-
tions of sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934105 in that the board-appointed "stock option committee"
granted new options, purportedly more favorable to defendant di-
rectors.10 6 In acknowledging the rule in Burks that the question
whether termination is authorized must be determined under the
law of the state of incorporation,107 the Lewis court noted that Dis-
ney was a California corporation and therefore California law con-
trolled.' 5 The Lewis court cited Findley to show that California
law allowed termination of such a suit within the board's business
judgment. It then resorted to analogy to show that California law
would allow similar action by a specially appointed committee of
the board.109 The court noted that in Abbey v. Control Data
Corp.,110 the Eighth Circuit held that under Delaware law a special
103. Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 176, 240 P.2d 421, 427 (1952).
104. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 783 n.2.
106. Id. at 780.
107. See 441 U.S. at 480.
108. 615 F.2d at 781.
109. Id. at 782.
110. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980). The court in
Abbey allowed the termination of a derivative suit alleging violations of §§ 13(a) and 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976). The court ap-
plied the two-stage Burks analysis and determined that Delaware law allowed the termina-
tion of the derivative suit by the specially appointed "Litigation Committee" and that such
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committee of the board could terminate a derivative suit under the
business judgment rule.111 The court then noted that section 311 of
the California Corporations Code1 2 was almost identical to section
141(c) of the Delaware Code. 13 The court therefore concluded that
a similar result would be reached in California if the issue were to
come before the California Supreme Court.
1" 4
termination did not frustrate the purpose of the federal statutes involved. In Maldonado v.
Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), however, Delaware's equity court reaffirmed the long
recognized business judgment rule but denied that the scope of the rule extended to allow
director termination of derivative suits. In Maldonado, a shareholders' derivative suit alleg-
ing breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the acceleration of the time for exercise of
stock options was brought against present and former directors and officers of Zapata Cor-
poration. After attempting an historical analysis of the business judgment rule, the court
determined that the rule was intended as a defensive shield to protect directors from liabil-
ity for poor business judgments made in good faith, but that it did not grant "any indepen-
dent power to a corporate board of directors to terminate a derivative suit." Id. at 1257. By
focusing exclusively on the rule's function to protect directors from liability for their un-
sound judgments, the court reasoned that in a derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty,
the rule should not function to "protect fraudulent, illegal, or reckless decisions by the di-
rectors." Id. at 1256. Although this is of course true, the court's narrow focus overlooks the
real purpose of the business judgment rule in the derivative suit context: to protect the
corporation's interests by protecting directors' decisions necessary to advance corporate in-
terests. The court holds that once proper demand is made upon the directors to prosecute
the suit and they refuse, the shareholders then have an independent right to continue the
suit and the directors' "reasons for such refusal need not be considered." Id. at 1261 (quot-
ing Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. 1927)). Preventing directors from terminating
derivative suits notwithstanding valid business reasons prevents directors from managing
the affairs of the corporation, and it takes away from them the control of the corporation
that the business judgment rule has so far served to ensure.
In light of longstanding United States Supreme Court cases such as Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U.S. 450 (1881), and United Copper See. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917), which not only affirm the business judgment rule but define its scope to allow direc-
tor termination of derivative suits, Maldonado is aberrational. Although as a matter of Del-
aware law the validity of Maldonado will be determined when it is heard by the Delaware
Supreme Court, if affirmed, it should not affect the ability of directors to terminate deriva-
tive suits in California because under Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421
(1952), California recognizes such decisions to be within the scope of directors' business
judgment.
111. 603 F.2d at 729-30.
112. CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1980). See note 101 supra.
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1975). See note 101 supra.
114. 615 F.2d at 783. The court further buttressed its analogy by citing Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1979), where a
motion for summary judgment was granted in favor of General Telephone and Electronics
Corporation after a special committee of three disinterested directors decided it was not in
the company's best interest to prosecute a derivative suit to recover $11,000,000 allegedly
paid out as bribes and kickbacks. The Lewis court quoted with approval the statement in
Auerbach that "[tihe substantive aspects of a decision to terminate a shareholders' deriva-
tive action against defendant corporate directors made by a committee of disinterested di-
rectors appointed by the corporation's board of directors are beyond judicial inquiry under
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The Lewis court's determination that California law would al-
low termination under the business judgment rule seems justified
under California case and statutory law. However, the court's rea-
soning, based on analogy to the corporations law of another state,
is weak. Even though state statutes authorizing the formation of
special committees may be similar,115 the analogy disregards par-
ticular legislative policy considerations that may differ between
states and that must be considered in interpreting the statute. The
Lewis court could have reached the same result by looking to the
California statutory provisions and the clear recognition of the
business judgment rule in Findley.116 Given that a California cor-
poration has issued shares and that it has more than two share-
holders, California law provides that the board of directors may
consist of as few as three directors. 1 7 A quorum is generally a ma-
jority of the board; however, California broadly allows that the ar-
ticles or bylaws may set a quorum at one-third the entire board or
two directors, whichever is greater.1 8 Consequently, given a nor-
mal three member board, as few as two members constitute a quo-
rum and embody the full authority of the board. Because a special
committee, authorized with the full power of the board, may also
consist of as few as two directors, the Lewis court's finding that
California law would allow termination by such a committee is
justified.
1 9
the business judgment doctrine .... 615 F.2d at 782-83 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d at 623, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922).
115. See note 101 supra.
116. See notes 91-98 & accompanying text supra.
117. CAL. CORP. CODE § 212(a) (West Supp. 1980) provides in part: "The bylaws shall
set forth... the number of directors of the corporation; or that the number of directors
shall be not less than a stated minimum nor more than a stated maximum. . . with the
exact number of directors to be fixed, within the limits specified, by approval of the board
or the shareholders ... in the manner provided in the bylaws, subject to paragraph (5) of
subdivision (a) of Section 204. The number or minimum number of directors shall not be
less than three; provided, however, that (1) before shares are issued, the number may be
one, (2) before shares are issued, the number may be two, (3) so long as the corporation has
only one shareholder, the number may be one, (4) so long as the corporation has only one
shareholder, the number may be two, and (5) so long as the corporation has only two share-
holders, the number may be two."
118. CAL. CORP. CODE § 307(a)(7) (West Supp. 1980) provides: -"A majority of the au-
thorized number of directors constitutes a quorum of the board for the transaction of busi-
ness. The articles or bylaws may not provide that a quorum shall be less than one-third the
authorized number of directors or less than two, whichever is larger, unless the authorized
number of directors is one, in which case one director constitutes a quorum."
119. 615 F.2d at 783.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
The ability to grant such power to a special committee of in-
dependent board directors gives corporate boards more freedom to
function. A board otherwise prevented from terminating a deriva-
tive suit because a majority of its members are implicated in the
wrongdoing can choose a special committee from the remaining
unimplicated directors. As long as quorum requirements are met,
the disinterested minority can act with the full power of the board.
Although there, is potential for abuse, because the implicated ma-
jority picks the disinterested special committee, the Lewis court
said that such potential was "inescapable.' 120 The court, however,
reasoned that an appropriate check existed because the trial court
could inquire into the committee's actual independence.121 Al-
though special committees of the board serve a useful function and
California law should allow them to decide the fate of a derivative
suit, under the two-stage analysis set forth in Burks the question
of whether their use to terminate a derivative suit under the ICA
or the IAA would be consistent with the federal policies underlying
the Acts must be considered.
California Director Termination of
Derivative Suits and the Underlying Policies
of the ICA and IAA
Federal Parameters
The second and final stage of the Burks analysis is to deter-
mine whether the termination of a shareholders' derivative suit
under California law would be inconsistent with the underlying
policies of the ICA and the IAA.122 Before beginning a comparison
of California law with federal policy, the superficial treatment of
the Burks test in Abbey v. Control Data Corp. 23 should be noted.
The suit in Abbey alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934124 with Delaware law the underlying state law. Although
the court analyzed Delaware law and determined that termination
was allowed, it failed to determine critically whether or not the law
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See notes 1-5 & accompanying text supra.
123. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980).
124. The complaint alleged violations of §§ 13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976). 603 F.2d at 727.
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was consistent with federal policy. Instead, the court stated that
termination would not be inconsistent because the claimed viola-
tions were only marginally related to the federal securities law
under which they were brought.125 In effect, the court ignored the
comparison of state and federal policy that serves as the founda-
tion for the Burks test and substituted an unprincipled rule au-
thorizing discretionary termination of marginally related claims.
Although some securities claims may fall in grey areas of the law, it
seems proper that a cause of action either is or is not stated. If a
claim states a cause of action then the Burks test should be ap-
plied to protect the claimant by requiring a showing of the consis-
tency of state law to federal law before termination may be made.
The proper analysis contemplated by Burks is a comparison of
procedural as well as substantive aspects of state law to federal
policy. Because the court in Burks did not fully state the applica-
ble federal policies, federal case law involving the ICA and the IAA
must be considered to determine the full extent of that policy. Be-
cause the federal courts consistently have treated the business
judgment rule as a federal question,126 they must necessarily and
implicitly have applied it in a manner consistent with federal pol-
icy. The federal case law may therefore be examined to establish
the parameters within which state law, under Burks, can operate
to terminate derivative suits. The areas of law that are most im-
portant to this comparison are: (1) the business judgment rule, (2)
the definition of an interested director, (3) the appointment of spe-
cial committees of the board in light of the ICA's requirement that
40% of the board be disinterested, (4) whether interested directors
can be counted for quorum purposes, (5) the sufficiency of infor-
mation considered by directors making the decision, and (6) the
requirement of an inquiry into disinterestedness before granting
summary judgment.
The Business Judgment Rule
One way to determine whether an application of the business
judgment rule by the California courts would lead to a result in-
consistent with the federal policies underlying the ICA and the
IAA is to determine whether California would apply the business
125. 603 F.2d at 731.
126. Federal common law has recognized the business judgment rule since the 19tb
century. See note 129 infra.
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judgment rule in a manner less protective of the purposes of the
Acts than would result under federal applications of the business
judgment rule. Findley v. Garrett127 is the leading California case
to allow termination of a derivative suit by a board of directors
based on the business judgment rule. In Findley, the court gave
broad discretion to the directors. Although some of the directors
were named defendants, the court upheld their exercise of business
judgment where the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to
implicate them in wrongdoing. In addition, the court held that
even if the corporation could recover damages from the defendant
directors, the board could still terminate the suit if the costs in
money, time, and disruption of the business outweighed potential
recovery.128
Federal law specifically dealing. with the ICA and the IAA as
well as federal law in general allows a similarly broad application
of the business judgment rule.12 The Burks court noted that the
function of independent directors is to protect the best interests of
the shareholders. The Court stated that
[t]here may well be situations in which the independent directors
could reasonably believe that the best interests of the sharehold-
ers call for a decision not to sue .... In such cases, it would
certainly be consistent with the Act [ICA] to allow the indepen-
dent directors to terminate a suit, even though not frivolous. In-
deed, it would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been
willing to rely largely upon 'watchdogs' to protect shareholder in-
terests and yet, where the 'watchdogs' have done precisely that,
127. 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952).
128. Id. at 177-78, 240 P.2d at 428.
129. The business judgment rule was recognized in the foundational case of United
Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917). Writing for the Court,
Justice Brandeis stated the basic structure of the rule: "Whether or not a corporation shall
seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business questions,
ordinarily a matter of internal management, and is left to the discretion of the directors, in
the absence of instruction by vote of the stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control
such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of miscon-
duct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which prevents
an unprejudiced exercise of judgment... ." Id. at 263-64. United Copper is partially based
on the earlier decision in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881), where the Court outlined
various instances when the directors' business judgment would not be used to terminate a
derivative suit. Such business judgment defense is inapplicable when the directors: (1) com-
mit or threaten to commit ultra vires acts, (2) commit fraud which will result in serious
injury to the corporation, or (3) act in self-interest in a manner destructive to the corpora-
tion or to the other shareholders' rights. Id. at 460.
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require that they be totally muzzled.
130
Shareholder interests can be protected by either attempting to
legislate appropriate safeguards to ensure that the board will act
independently, or by allowing greater resort to derivative suits so
that shareholders may thereby police director decisions by threat
of legal action. In the context of the ICA, Congress has attempted
to protect shareholder interests first with the ICA of 1940, "11 and
then with the 1970 amendments.3 2 When the court of appeals in
Lasker v. Burks"33 held that the question of termination was
outside the authority of the directors, it attempted to "muzzle
them" by disregarding their raison d'etre. Burks, by reversing the
court of appeals, restates Congress' intent to protect shareholder
interests and to police director business judgment through the
statute and not the courts.
Defining Interested Director
The application of state law to dismiss a derivative suit could
undermine the underlying policies of the ICA if the state law de-
fined "interested director" less inclusively than the statutory defi-
nition under the ICA.'s 4 If a derivative action were allowed to be
dismissed because of the exercise of the business judgment of di-
rectors who, regardless of their good faith, could be classified as
"interested" under the ICA standards,13 5 such a dismissal would be
improper and would frustrate the purpose of the Act by blocking
the remedy it was designed to provide."'6
Although there is little law on the subject, California appears
to equate director interestedness with the existence of a material
financial relationship between the director and the corporation. 31
In Findley, the court found that a majority of the board was not
interested because it did not own any stock in the corporation's
related leasing corporation. 8 The definition of interestedness
130. 441 U.S. at 485.
131. See note 2 supra.
132. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See notes 23-43 & accompanying text supra.
133. 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1976). See notes 30-39 & accompanying text supra.
135. Id.
136. See notes 23-43 & accompanying text supra.
137. See Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952).
138. Id. at 173, 177, 240 P.2d at 425, 427.
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under federal law, in comparison, is much broader. It includes an
"affiliated" person under the ICA 39 such as anyone who owns 5%
or more of outstanding stock or the agent or partner of anyone who
controls such stock, any member of the immediate family of an
affiliated person,14 0 and anyone who has acted as legal counsel for
the investment company within the previous two years.'
Although an interested person under the ICA will generally
have a material financial relationship with the fund so that the
person would also be considered interested under California law, a
situation could arise where a director has a close family relation-
ship to an affiliate of the fund, but lacks any material financial
interest. In such a case, although the director would not be consid-
ered interested under California law, the Burks test would man-
date that federal standards control and that a decision to termi-
nate by such a board must be disregarded as inconsistent with the
federal policies underlying the Act.
Interested Directors Counted for Quorum
A somewhat similar situation arises if, in the context of termi-
nation of a derivative suit brought under the ICA, state law allows
interested directors to be present, to participate, or to be counted
for quorum purposes even though not permitted to vote. California
Corporations Code section 310(c) provides that "[i]nterested or
common directors may be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum at a meeting of the board or a committee thereof which
authorizes, approves or ratifies a contract or transaction.' 4 2 Al-
though this section is limited to allowing an interested director to
be counted for quorum at a meeting ratifying a contract, it ex-
pressly points out that interested directors may to some limited
extent participate in decisions regarding their interests. This con-
clusion is supported by Olson v. Basin Oil Co.," 3 a derivative suit
brought in 1955 in the California courts to impress a trust on cer-
tain personally held off leases of an oil company president. The
board in Olson had refused to initiate the suit. The complaint al-
139. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976).
140. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3), (19).
141. Id.
142. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(c) (West 1977) (emphasis added). For similar provisions in
other states, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8(2) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. Cop. LAW §
713(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
143. 136 Cal. App. 2d 543, 288 P.2d 952 (1955).
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leged breach of fiduciary duty and abuse of corporate opportunity
by the company's president, an individual who also served as presi-
dent and director of two oil companies. On repeated occasions the
board considered transactions in which the president was person-
ally interested, and although the president abstained from voting,
he was present at such meetings and was counted for quorum pur-
poses. 1 4  The court nonetheless affirmed the judgment ordering
dismissal of plaintiffs' claim and affirmed the denial of plaintiffs'
motion to vacate the dismissal. 45 This case indicates, as does Cor-
porations Code section 310(c), 4 that California allows at least lim-
ited participation in board decisionmaking by interested directors.
Although neither expressly allows an interested director to partici-
pate in a decision to terminate a derivative suit, especially one
brought under the ICA with its statutory emphasis on disinterest-
edness, their implicit allowance of interested director participation
must be contrasted to the clear federal rule.
The federal courts which have addressed the issue of corporate
board action to terminate a derivative suit strongly indicate that
the entire board, or special committee if one is appointed, must
meet, discuss the matter, and vote as a completely separate and
disinterested body. In Tannenbaum v. Zeller,14 , a derivative suit
was brought under the ICA by a shareholder of an open-end mu-
tual fund 45 against its investment adviser. In upholding the deci-
sion of the independent directors not to prosecute the action, the
court stated: "The evidence demonstrates that the independent
directors separately considered the subject, investigated it ...
and arrived at their own conclusion .... -19
144. Id. at 553-54, 288 P.2d at 958-59. Although the facts do not specifically so indi-
cate, it appears from the inclusive reference to "board of directors" that the interested pres-
ident voted at the meeting of January 6, 1954, at which time the board adopted the resolu-
tion refusing to initiate the action against the company's president. Id. at 555, 288 P.2d at
960.
145. Id. at 567, 288 P.2d at 967.
146. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(c) (West 1977).
147. 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
148. For the definition of an open-end mutual fund, see notes 20-22 & accompanying
text supra.
149. 552 F.2d at 426-27 (emphasis added). The complaint alleged breach of fiduciary
duty based on the adviser's decision to forego certain brokerage fees, thereby using the fees
as a form of compensation to dealers. Although the court recognized an implied private right
of action under § 36 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976), 552 F.2d at 417, it held that
the decision to forego the fees did not violate the fiduciary duty of the fund's adviser or of
the independent directors. Id. at 428-29.
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Similarly, in the post-Burks case of Abbey v. Control Data
Corp.,150 an autonomous special litigation committee was ap-
pointed by the corporate board to investigate a derivative suit al-
leging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.151 The
committee was composed of seven of the "outside" members of the
board. No committee member had been named in the suit, and
there was no evidence that any member even had contemporane-
ous knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing. The committee investi-
gated the charges, retained independent counsel, and decided that
the suit was not in the best interests of the corporation. In uphold-
ing both the committee's decision not to prosecute the suit and its
motion for summary judgment, the court stated that "the [busi-
ness judgment] rule apparently applies to any reasonable good
faith determination by an independent board of directors. ... 152
The recent Ninth Circuit case of Lewis v. Anderson5" is in
accord. In Lewis, a special committee was appointed by an in-
volved corporate board to decide whether the derivative suit
should be prosecuted. The committee consisted of two outside di-
rectors and one director who was a named defendant but who did
not benefit from the alleged wrongful transaction. The committee
met nine times, was advised by independent legal counsel,"" and
ultimately decided to terminate the derivative action. The Ninth
Circuit upheld the committee's decision, stating that "the substan-
tive aspects of a decision to terminate a shareholders' derivative
action against defendant corporate directors made by a committee
of disinterested directors appointed by the corporation's board of
directors are beyond judicial inquiry under the business judgment
doctrine .... ,,"
These cases indicate the great emphasis the federal courts
place on the independence of the board or special committee con-
sidering the decision to terminate a derivative suit. Factors that
the courts consider in determining independence are: (1) whether
the directors exercising their business judgment are properly
150. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980).
151. See note 124 supra.
152. 603 F.2d at 730 (emphasis added).
153. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
154. See note 160 infra.
155. 615 F.2d at 782-83 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623, 393 N.E.2d
994, 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1979)).
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named in the suit;158 (2) the composition of the special committee
if one is appointed;157 (3) whether the committee meets indepen-
dently from the board;1 58 (4) the number of times the committee
meets to consider the derivative suit; 59 and (5) the existence and
quality of any independent legal or business advice given directly
to the special committee.1 60 In light of the federal cases emphasiz-
ing complete independence of the board or special committee, if
one is appointed, for a decision to terminate a derivative suit
under the ICA or the IAA to be consistent with the federal policies
underlying the Acts it is critical that the deciding body meet
outside of the presence of interested directors and that it affirm its
independence by incorporating the above factors determinative of
independence into its decisionmaking process.
Appointment of Special Committees and the ICA's Forty
Percent Requirement.
The ICA's requirement that at least forty percent of the fund's
board meet statutory requirements81  for disinterestedness
presents special considerations when a special committee of the
board is appointed to consider a derivative suit. The requirement,
which is designed to safeguard shareholder interests, could be un-
dermined if a special committee of the board were appointed, ex-
cluding the statutorily disinterested directors, but nonetheless
composed of directors who would be considered interested under
156. See generally 615 F.2d at 780. For a general discussion of the impropriety of
naming a director defendant on information and belief unsupported by sufficient evidence,
see notes 95-101 & accompanying text supra.
157. See generally Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 510 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (showing that the directors on the special committee had been elected to the board
after the alleged wrongdoing).
158. See generally Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lasker
v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
159. See generally Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
160. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402,
426-27 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977) (special committee of the board
advised by independent counsel). In the court of appeals' opinion in Lasker v. Burks, 567
F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1978), the facts indicate that the committee was independently
advised by Stanley H. Fuld, former chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals. For
further examples of the use of independent reports, see Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778,
780 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1979); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp.
817, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
BURKS V. LASKER
section 2(a)(19) of the ICA.16 2 For example, assume a shareholders'
derivative suit is brought in California against a registered mutual
fund incorporated in California that has a ten member board.
Eight of the ten directors are considered disinterested by the board
and the remaining two are clearly interested. Four of the eight dis-
interested directors are statutorily disinterested, meeting the ICA's
forty percent requirement. Quorum is established under the bylaws
as three. If the entire board meets and appoints the four statuto-
rily disinterested directors as a special committee to consider the
derivative suit, the propriety of the committee cannot be ques-
tioned except on the grounds that one of the directors is not, in
fact, statutorily disinterested. However, assuming that each of the
four is statutorily disinterested, the ICA's safeguard of having stat-
utorily disinterested directors contribute to the decisionmaking is
met. In contrast, the safeguard would be undermined and an even-
tual decision to terminate would be inconsistent with the purposes
of the ICA if the committee were composed of the other four direc-
tors, considered disinterested by the board but who did not meet
the requirements for disinterestedness under the ICA.' e8 The safe-
guard is defeated because by allowing the entire board, composed
of interested and disinterested directors, to exclude some or all of
the statutorily disinterested directors in selecting the special com-
mittee, it allows the board to pick those directors who presumably
would vote more favorably for director, rather than shareholder,
interests.
In Burks, the Fund had an eleven member board, five of
whom were implicated in the suit and one of whom was a director
of the adviser. The entire board decided that the five remaining
directors, at least four of whom met the ICA standards for dis-
interestness, would consider the derivative suit.'" Thus, in Burks,
all of the statutorily disinterested directors were on the special
committee. Although Lewis v.. Anderson6 5 and Abbey v. Control
Data Corp.6'6 hold that special committees of the board may be
formed to terminate a derivative action, because the suits were not
brought under the ICA, their holdings must be qualified if used as
support for the formation of special committees to consider a suit
162. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19).
163. Id.
164. 441 U.S. at 474.
165.. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
166. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980).
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brought under the ICA. Not only must the committee be indepen-
dent and meet quorum requirements, to avoid attack, it must in-
clude the statutorily disinterested directors.
The manner in which the board selects the committee is also
determinative of the committee's disinterestedness. The Lewis
court addressed the criticism that any committee selected by a
mixed board of interested and disinterested directors could not be
disinterested and it stated that the possible bias in the selection
process was an " 'inescapable' aspect of 'the corporation's predica-
ment.' ",167 Although not done in Burks, even though quorum re-
quirements could have been met,6 " the best method for selecting
an independent committee is for the entire board to meet, excuse
the obviously interested directors, and if quorum requirements can
still be met, have the remaining directors vote to select the special
committee.
Sufficiency of Information
Federal case law requires that the decision to terminate a de-
rivative action be based on sufficient information about the suit
and its alternatives. In Tannenbaum v. Zeller,16 9 the Second Cir-
cuit enumerated various factors that determine whether the direc-
tors' decision to terminate a derivative suit breaches their fiduciary
duty. The court stated there would be no breach of duty if the
independent directors "(1) were not dominated or unduly influ-
enced by the investment adviser; (2) were fully informed by the
adviser and interested directors [regarding the course of action to
be taken]; and (3) fully aware of this information, reached a rea-
sonable business decision . . . after a thorough review of all rele-
vant factors."1170 Similarly, in Imperial Financial Services, Inc.,
7 1
the Securities and Exchange Commission emphasized that an un-
derlying policy of the ICA is that the independent directors are
supplied with sufficient information upon which to make their de-
cisions. The Commission stated:
167. 615 F.2d at 783 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979)).
168. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (bylaws showing
that quorum was as few as one-third of the board, thus only requiring four members of a ten
member board).
169. 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
170. 552 F.2d at 418-19.
171. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fm. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,287, at 82,455 (1965).
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The Investment Company Act's requirement as to unaffiliated di-
rectors, if its purposes are not to be subverted, carries with it the
obligation on the part of the affiliated directors, and the invest-
ment adviser itself, to insure that unaffiliated directors are fur-
nished with sufficient information so as to enable them to partici-
pate effectively in the management of the investment company.
Shareholders and potential shareholders are entitled to rely upon
the implication that the unaffiliated directors are acting with full
knowledge of relevant facts.
172
The question of sufficiency of information was not even raised
in Findley v. Garrett.17 1 While the federal cases emphasize the re-
quirement of an informed decision, they do not definitively state
whether the directors must make a showing of the information re-
lied upon. Although there is no indication that California law
would not require a showing of the information relied upon, it
would defeat the purposes of the ICA and the IAA safeguards if
state law did not require the board or the special committee, if one
is appointed, to reveal the information it relied upon. Because the
decision to terminate so drastically cuts off plaintiffs' rights, the
burden of demonstrating that the decision was made in accordance
with proper procedures should be on the directors.
Summary Judgment
Another underlying policy in the federal cases dealing with
termination of derivative suits is that a special inquiry into the
disinterestedness of the board or committee should be made before
granting summary judgment. In the district court's opinion in
Lasker v. Burks, the court recognized the valid exercise of the spe-
cial committee's business judgment to terminate the suit; however,
it denied the motion for summary judgment pending discovery on
the issue of the committee's independence."1 4 Similarly, in Bern-
stein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito,175 the court granted discov-
ery on the matter before it granted summary judgment even
though it stated that "[t]he Complaint herein is devoid of any alle-
gation that the alleged wrongdoers had control of the Board of Di-
rectors . .. or that the Board's decision was contaminated by
172. Id. at 82,464.
173. 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952).
174. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
175. 69 F.R.D. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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fraud or collusion or any misconduct whatever. 1 7 Also in accord
is Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 77 a case involving sharehold-
ers who brought a derivative action to enjoin the company from
implementing a proposed retirement plan. The district court
granted summary judgment upon affidavits of the directors that
they had exercised their best business judgment in terminating the
suit. The court of appeals reversed, stating that in the context of
the business judgment defense the affidavits were insufficient to
support a motion for summary judgment.
17 8
In Findley, the action was terminated when the directors re-
fused to prosecute the suit and the court refused to grant leave to
amend the amended complaint. Although the court made a thor-
ough inquiry into the interestedness of the directors, it was not
presented with the question of summary judgment. If a similar sit-
uation were to arise involving a motion for summary judgment, it
would be highly unusual for a California court not to grant a prop-
erly made motion for discovery. Because of the potential for abuse
that the ICA and the IAA protect against, allowing discovery on
the issue of director interestedness is essential to the Acts' safe-
guards. Therefore, granting summary judgment in a derivative suit
without first allowing discovery regarding interestedness would be
inconsistent with federal law and the policies underlying the Acts.
Conclusion
A limited private right of action exists under both the ICA
and the IAA. It appears that a federal court interpreting California
law under the two-stage Burks analysis could validly terminate a
shareholder derivative action brought under either Act. Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis,1 79 restricting private
rights of action under the IAA, and the post-Burks cases such as
Lewis v. Anderson, e° giving great leeway to director discretion to
terminate derivative actions, reflect the courts' increasing trend to
176. Id. at 596.
177. 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948).'
178. Id. at 662-63. But see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 635-36, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929-30 (1979) (holding that it was error to deny the motion
for summary judgment because on the facts there was no basis to inquire into the indepen-
dence of the committee).
179. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
180. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
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restrict shareholder access to the courts for relief.
To maximize the probability that a California court could val-
idly uphold the termination of a derivative suit involving the ICA
or the IAA, a board of directors should take the following precau-
tions: (1) form a special committee of statutorily independent di-
rectors who either are not named in the suit or are named only as
fraud participants on information and belief where discovery
would not lead to facts supporting fraud, (2) retain separate coun-
sel, (3) meet and discuss the issue separately from the board, (4)
base the decision to terminate the suit on sufficient information
supplied to them, and (5) make a showing of the information relied
upon. Although these precautions increase the likelihood that ter-
mination would be allowed under Burks, it must be remembered
by both the bench and the bar that each case presents a unique.
group of facts against which an application of state law must be
examined.

